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Abstract
The question of the main determinants of persistent responses due to nom-
inal shocks captures, at least since Chari et al. (2000), a major part of the
recent macroeconomic debate. However, the question whether sticky wages
and/or sticky prices are suﬃcient for persistent reactions of key economic
variables remains open.
In the present model we allow for nominal rigidities due to Taylor- like
wage setting as well as price adjustment costs. However, as our analysis illus-
trates, smoothing marginal costs seems crucial to derive a contract multiplier,
wage staggering alone is not suﬃcient. Without considering a more speciﬁc
analysis of factor market frictions, we enforce a point made by Erceg (1997)
by analyzing the structure of money demand. In particular, we analyze a
‘standard’ consumption based money demand function by varying the inter-
est rate elasticity of money demand as well as the steady state rate of money
holdings. Our results show that the persistency of the output/price dynamics
can be aﬀected crucially by the form of the implicit money demand function.
In particular, it is shown that staggered wage contracts have to be accompa-
nied by a suﬃciently low interest rate elasticity, otherwise the model fails to
reproduce reasonable responses of real variables.
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1 Introduction
The question of the contribution of monetary shocks to the explanation of business
cycles has been explored intensively in the recent past. For these shocks to play a
signiﬁcant role it is, however, necessary to overcome the classical neutrality result,
that is, some nominal rigidity is required. An already voluminous literature has ex-
plored the extent to which imperfect information and adjustment costs can generate
nominal stickiness.1 While crucial aspects have been explored initially in partial
equilibrium models, the recent literature places the analysis of monetary impulses
and propagation mechanisms in dynamic general equilibrium settings and thereby
implements this issue into a more genuine business cycle framework.
The ﬁnding that monetary shocks can have important real eﬀects is, however,
only half of the story. As a series of recent empirical studies has shown, see e.g.
Christiano et al. (1999), persistence in output adjustment is an essential property
of business cycle ﬂuctuations and a model allowing a signiﬁcant role of monetary
shocks should be able to account for this observation.
A wide class of dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models account for monetary
non-neutrality through various mechanisms causing price and/or wage stickiness.
These mechanisms include Fischer wage or price contracts (Cho and Cooley (1995)),
Calvo staggered and overlapping price and wage contracts (Yun (1996), King and
Watson (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003)) or menu costs
(Rotemberg (1996), Ireland (1997)). However, these models can be criticized either
for building in a large exogenous component of price/wage stickiness or for failing to
generate a reasonable degree of persistency, when only a modest exogenous degree
of stickiness is incorporated.
In an inﬂuential paper Chari et al. (2000) have illustrated that a prototypical
DGE model of the business cycle which includes money and price setting ﬁrms
still lacks a quantitatively important transmission mechanism which propagates the
monetary impact eﬀect via (real) propagation mechanisms, i.e. such models do
not show a contract multiplier, that is, output persistence does not go beyond the
contract length. They exemplify this by implementing staggered price setting into
a DGE model. In the spirit of Taylor (1980) Chari et al. (2000) incorporate an
exogenous source of price stickiness by the assumption that contracts last for four
1For a detailed survey see Andersen (1998).
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periods, and examine whether the model can account for endogenous output and
price persistence. One of the main conclusion is that the inability of the DGE model
to account for persistent output eﬀects is basically due to the high procyclicality of
marginal cost implied by standard assumptions about preferences, technology and
factor market-clearing.
In a similar vein, several authors investigating sticky price models (Ball and
Romer (1990), Romer (1993), Christiano et al. (1997), Huang and Liu (1999, 2002)
Koenig (2000), Ascari (2003) or Andersen (2004)) infer that labour market fric-
tions may play a key role in order to allow sticky price models to account for a
contract multiplier without incorporating an implausibly large exogenous compo-
nent of price stickiness.2 More generally, the outcome of Chari et al. (2000) has
engendered a growing literature aimed at developing alternative mechanisms for
producing higher persistence. Examples include Bergin and Feenstra (2000), who
combine a staggered-price mechanism with factor speciﬁcity and a non-CES produc-
tion function or the study by Kiley (1997) who obtains the result of non-persistent
real responses to monetary shocks by emphasizing compositional changes in output
over the cycle. However, the most popular approach in this literature appears to
be one in which staggered wage contracts are used as either an alternative or as a
complement to they studies by Erceg (1997), Andersen (1998) or Huang and Liu
(1999).3
Following Erceg (1997) we implement a dynamic wage-setting process that gen-
erates an empirically sensible degree of persistence into a DGE model. This process
is derived from a household’s optimization problem in a framework that is basically
a dynamic version of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). The labour inputs of diﬀerent
households are imperfect substitutes in production. Therefore, households behave as
monopolistic suppliers of labour, taking their labour demand curve and the prevail-
ing average wage as given. As in Taylor (1980), households ﬁx their nominal wage
for a given period of time, and agree to satisfy demand for their labour at this wage.
In addition, wage setting is asynchronous, as only some of the households adjust
their nominal wages in a given period. This wage setting process is embedded into
a standard dynamic general equilibrium model, as, for instance, Ireland (1997).
2A recent example of a monetary DGE model where the labour market is characterized by job
creation and destruction can be found in Walsh (2003a).
3See also Edge (2002) for model with staggered prices under the assumption of non-homogenous
factor markets.
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Our results show that a Taylor-like wage setting process derived from a house-
hold optimization problem can generate a high degree of nominal wage persistence,
even though standard assumptions about preferences and technology are made. In
other words, it is not, for example, necessary for the intertemporal elasticity of
labour supply to be implausibly large. The model exhibits price and wage rigidity
basically by smoothing the marginal costs of agents setting prices and wages relative
to the marginal costs of the average ﬁrm or household. The smoothing is thereby
attributable to substitution eﬀects that reduce the relative demand of households
readjusting their wages.
However, our analysis illustrates that while smoothing marginal costs seems cru-
cial to derive a contract multiplier, wage staggering per se is not suﬃcient. In
addition, we enforce a point made by Erceg (1997) by analyzing the structure of
money demand which is implied by the household’s optimization problem. As we
will show below, necessary conditions for persistent output eﬀects are a low interest
rate elasticity and low rate of steady state money holdings. In line with Erceg (1997)
our results reﬂect that output/price dynamics can be aﬀected crucially by the form
of the (implicit) money demand function.
In our model we assume that ﬁrms adjust their pricing facing quadratic ad-
justment costs (see e.g. Rotemberg (1982), Hairault and Portier (1993), or Ireland
(1997)), in contrast to the assumption of staggered price setting. It has been already
shown by Gerke (2001) that this kind of nominal price stickiness alone, in contrast to
Calvo staggering, is not able to generate persistent reactions even when adjustment
costs are unreasonably high. This result does not change when quadratic adjust-
ments costs interact with staggered wage setting. However, as a benchmark, we
allow in a basic formulation, that prices adjust without any frictions. Moreover, we
allow for a secular trend in inﬂation as this is a feature shared by all industrialized
countries and, as Ascari (2000) has shown, a positive inﬂation rate can crucially
inﬂuence the model’s ability in generating persistency: the higher the steady state
rate of inﬂation the lower the degree of persistency.
Besides the question as to which kind of rigidity is crucial in order to generate
persistency, we raise the question whether our monetary DGE model is capable of
replicating stylized facts of the business cycle. In particular, the persistent response
of inﬂation we ﬁnd in our numerical examinations is able to ﬁt the autocorrelation
structure of inﬂation (and its cross correlation with output) found in the date (see
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e.g. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)). In addition, the model accounts, to some extent,
for a procyclicality in the real wage which is, for instance, reported by Huang et al.
(2004) for the U.S. post war period.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section out-
lines the market structure as well as the decision problems of the model. In the third
section the equilibrium solution is derived. In sections four and ﬁve we present the
results of our quantitative analysis. Section six concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Market structure of the model
We assume that the economy consists of a continuum of households, a representa-
tive ﬁrm which produces a ﬁnal good which either can be consumed or invested, a
continuum of ﬁrms producing intermediate goods and a monetary authority. The
intermediate goods ﬁrms produce capital goods with capital and labour as inputs for
the use as inputs in the ﬁnal good sector. Because of the assumption that interme-
diate goods are imperfect substitutes this market is characterized by monopolistic
competition. Whereas, the ﬁnal good and capital services are exchanged in per-
fectly competitive markets. The labour market is characterized by the existence
of a representative agent (job bundler) who mediates labour supply and demand
between households and intermediate goods ﬁrms. Wage staggering is introduced
by assuming that the households have to ﬁx their nominal wages for four periods
after entering the mediation process.5
The household sector
The households are characterized by the maximization of their intertemporal utility
with respect to a given budget constraint. The utility of an arbitrary household j
is given by:
Uj = Et
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
ct(j), lt(j),mt(j)
)]
, (1)
4A more detailed survey of the cyclicality of real wages over the business cycle can be found in
Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995).
5See Gerke (2003): 154/5.
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where β ∈ [0, 1] denotes a discount factor. Furthermore, ct(j), lt(j), and mt(j) ≡
Mt(j)/Pt denote consumption, leisure and the demand of real cash balances, respec-
tively, of the j-th household. We assume that total hours are normalized to one, i.e.
nt(j) + lt(j) = 1.
We assume further, that the household owns and accumulates the capital stock.
Capital is rented to the intermediate goods sector for a payment Ptrtkt−1 of nominal
interest. The evolution of physical capital, kt, is speciﬁed as
kt(j) = (1− δ)kt−1(j) + It(j), (2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and It(j) denote the depreciation rate and the household’s invest-
ments, respectively.
Every period, the j-th household oﬀers an amount of nt(j) of hours to the job
- mediator under the condition that it earns a nominal wage wt(j). Furthermore,
it is assumed that the household holds its nominal wage constant for four periods.
Thus, every period only the j-th household is able to adjust its nominal wage rate.
Besides capital and wage income we assume that the j-th household receives a
lump-sum transfer τt(j) of newly created money and a fraction st(j) of the interme-
diate goods ﬁrms nominal proﬁts Πt(j).
The households budget constraint follows as
τt(j)+wt(j)nt(j)+rtkt−1(j)+Mt−1(j)+
∫ 1
0
st(j)Πt(i)di = Ptct(j)+PtIt(j)+Mt(j),
(3)
where Pt denotes the price of the ﬁnal good.
The nominal wage of the j-th household follows from its utility maximization
with respect to its inverse labour demand function which ensures that the demand
and supply of labour services equalize.
The representative job-bundler
It is assumed that every period the mediator buys nj,t hours from the j-th house-
hold. Afterwards, he cumulates individual hours to the aggregate hours, nt. The
aggregation of individual hours is determined by the following technology
nt =
[∫ 1
0
nt(j)
ζ−1
ζ dj
] ζ
ζ−1
, (4)
with ξ > 1. Given equation (4) the elasticity of substitution of individual labour
input follows as −ζ.
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Final good producers
The production of the ﬁnal good which either can be consumed or invested is de-
scribed by the production technology
yt =
[ ∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
, (5)
where yt denotes the ﬁnal good and yt(i) represents the intermediate good of type
i. Furthermore, it is assumed that θ > 1 and the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods is given by −θ.
The intermediate goods sector
Each intermediate goods ﬁrm produces a distinct good i ∈ [0, 1] with labour and
capital as inputs. These intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes and are sold
in a market under monopolistic competition. We assume a linear homogenous pro-
duction technology with constant returns to scale:6
yt(i) = f
(
kt−1(i), nt(i), zt
)
, (6)
where kt−1(i) and nt(i) denote capital and labour employed by the i-th intermediate
goods ﬁrm, furthermore, zt represents a shock in total factor productivity which
follows a stationary stochastic process
log zt = (1− ψz) log z¯ + ψz log zt−1 + zt , (7)
with zt ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2z) and ψz ∈ [0, 1]. In every period the intermediate goods
producer i demands for nUt (i) units of labour. The respective nominal wage w
N
t is
paid to the representative job bundler. In addition, they rent kUt−1(i) units of capital
and pay every period t rNt k
U
t−1(i) to the households.
Following Rotemberg (1982) each intermediate goods producer is faced with a
quadratic cost function which describes the adjustment of its nominal price. This
cost function is expressed as
φP
2
[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt. (8)
Equation (8) highlights the notion that price changes might have negative eﬀects on
customer - ﬁrm relationships. These negative eﬀects increase with the magnitude of
the price change and the level of economic activity.
6Furthermore, it is assumed that the production function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
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The monetary authority
The monetary authority determines the money supply of the economy. In every
period t, nominal money supply grows at an exogenous rate gt, i.e. Mt = (1 +
gt)Mt−1. The newly created money is paid to the household as a lump-sum transfer.
The transfer satisﬁes:
τt = Mt −Mt−1 (9)
By the deﬁnition of the growth rate of money, real balances (mt ≡ Mt/Pt) can be
expressed as
mt =
1 + gt
1 + πt
mt−1, (10)
where πt denotes the inﬂation rate at time t. With g¯ as the steady state growth rate
of money, we deﬁne ω¯t = gt − g¯ as the deviation of the growth rate from its steady
state. As in Walsh (2003b) ω¯ is formulated as a stochastic process7
ω¯t = ψω¯ω¯t−1 + φzzt−1 + ω¯t , (11)
with ψω¯ ∈ (0, 1] and ω¯t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2ω¯). Furthermore, it is assumed that each
household has knowledge of the realization of ω¯t and zt when choosing its optimal
values of consumption, leisure, real balances and capital in period t.
2.2 Decision Problems
The representative job mediator acts on perfect competitive markets. In every period
t he chooses the proﬁt maximizing amount of nt(j) ∀ j ∈ (0, 1):
max
nt(j)
wNt nt −
∫ 1
0
wt(j)
Nnt(j)dj, (12)
where wNt describes the price of aggregate labour in monetary units, furthermore,
wNt (i) denotes the nominal wage earned by the j-th household. Given (12), the
demand for labour services follows as
ndt (j) =
[wNt (j)
wNt
]−ζ
nt. (13)
Because of the zero proﬁt condition due to the assumption of perfect competition,
the wage level for aggregate labour services results as:
wNt =
[∫ 1
0
wNt (j)
1−ζdj
] 1
1−ζ
. (14)
7See Walsh (2003b), p. 69. Note further that eqn. (11) is expressed in logs.
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Proﬁt maximizing behavior of the ﬁnal good producer, given by
max
yt(i)
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di, (15)
where Pt(i) denotes the price of the intermediate good (i), leads to the following
demand for intermediate goods:
ydt (i) =
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt. (16)
Because of the zero proﬁt condition, the price level is determined as:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (17)
The optimization problem of the intermediate goods producers is to maximize
the present value of proﬁts8
max Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt(j)Πt(i)
Pt
, (18)
where βtλt/Pt denotes the marginal utility value of the representative household of
an additional unit of proﬁts during period t. The nominal proﬁts of ﬁrm i, Πt, are
deﬁned as:
Πt(i) = Pt(i)yt(i)− wNt nt−1 − rNt kUt−1(i)− Pt
φP
2
[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt. (19)
Equation (18) is maximized subject to the following constraint:
yst (i) = f
(
kt(i), nt(i), zt
)
=
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
ydt . (20)
Maximizing the intermediate goods producer’s decision problem leads to the follow-
ing ﬁrst order conditions:9
λt(j)rt = ξtfk
(
kt−1(i), nt(i), zt
)
, (21)
λt(j)wt = ξtfn
(
kt−1(i), nt(i), zt
)
, (22)
0 = λt(j)(1− θ)
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ yt
Pt
− λt(j)φp
[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
] yt
Pt−1
(23)
+ξtθ
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ−1 yt
Pt
+ βEt
{
λt+1(j)φp
[Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
− 1
]
yt+1
Pt+1(i)
[Pt(i)]2
}
.
8Note that βtλt(j) is a stochastic discount factor (pricing kernel). See Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), p. 1160 and 1168.
9Note that subscripts, except t and t− 1, denote partial derivatives.
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Note that ξt represents the discounted Lagrange - multiplier of the ﬁrm’s maximiza-
tion problem. From equations (21) and (22) follows that the respective marginal
product of capital and labour inputs does not equal the factor payments. Further-
more, equation (23) gives the optimal price decision of intermediate goods ﬁrms.
The households choose their utility maximizing wages with respect to their labour
demand function, but they do so by ﬁxing the nominal wage for four periods, i.e. t,
t+ 1, t+ 2, t+3. However, in every period the labour market is in equilibrium, i.e.
nst(j) = n
d
t (j). Consequently, the households maximization problem reads as
max
ct(j),wNt (j),k
H
t (j),m
H
t (j)
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
ct(j),mt(j), 1−
[wNt (j)
wNt
]−ζ
nt
)}
(24)
subject to
wNt (j)
[wNt (j)
wNt
]−ζ
nt + Pt(1 + rt − δ)kHt−1(j)
+τt(j) + Mt−1(j) +
∫ 1
0
st(j)Πt(i)di = Ptct(j) + Ptkt(j) + Mt(j). (25)
Maximization of equations (24) and (25) leads to the following ﬁrst order conditions:
Ptλt(j) = uc(·) (26)
λt(j) = uM(·) 1
Pt
+ βEtλt+1(j) (27)
Ptλt(j) = βEtλt+1(j)Pt+1(1 + rt+1 − δ) (28)
0 =
3∑
s=0
βt+sEtuw(j)
(
ct(j),mt(j), 1−
[wNt (j)
wNt+s
]−ζ
nt+s
)
(29)
·ζ
[wNt (j)
wNt+s
]−ζ−1 nt+s
wNt+s
+ Etλt+1(j)(1− ζ)
(
wNt+s(j)
)−ζ(
wNt+s
)ζ
nt+s
In order to simplify the solution we assume a perfect insurance market. There-
fore, the optimal decision about the wage rate is independent of any idiosyncratic
risks. Furthermore, because of the identical initial factor endowments and the sep-
arability of consumption and leisure, we assume that all households are identical in
their demand for money and consumption goods as well as in their capital accumu-
lation.10
10See, for example, Ascari (2000): 671, for similar assumptions.
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3 Equilibrium Solution
In the symmetric equilibrium where
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)di = Pt the following conditions hold:
∫ 1
0
kt−1(i)di = kt−1 (30)
∫ 1
0
yt(i)di = yt. (31)
No symmetry is given for individual nominal wages, wNt (j), real wages, wt(j), and
for the individual labour supply nt(j).
The aggregate resource constraint follows as:
yt = ct + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 + φP
2
[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt. (32)
Because of the symmetry, equations (21) to (23) simplify to
λtrt = ξtfk(kt−1, nt, zt) (33)
λtwt. = ξtfn(kt−1, nt, zt) (34)
0 = λt(1− θ)− λtφP
[ Pt
Pt−1
− 1
] Pt
Pt−1
+ ξtθ (35)
βEt
{
λt+1φP
[Pt+1
Pt
− 1
]yt+1
yt
Pt+1
Pt
}
.
Furthermore, from the ﬁrst order conditions of the j-th household as well as the i-th
intermediate goods producers follows in the symmetric equilibrium
uc
(·) = uM(·)+ βEt
[
uc
(
ct+1,mt+1, 1−
(wt(j)
wt+1
)−ζ
nt+1
) 1
1 + πt+1
]
, (36)
uc
(·) = βEtRt+1uc
(
ct+1,mt+1, 1−
(wt(j)
wt+1
)−ζ
nt+1
)
(37)
Rt =
1
µt
fk(kt−1, nt, zt) + 1− δ (38)
0 =
3∑
s=0
βt+sEtuw(j)
(
ct,mt, 1−
(wt(j)
wt+s
)−ζ
nt+s
)
ζ
(wt(j)
wt+s
)−ζ−1 nt+s
wt+s
(39)
+Etuc
(
ct,mt, 1−
(wt(j)
wt+s
)−ζ
nt+s
) 1
Pt+s
(1− ζ)(wt+s(j))−ζ(wt+s)ζnt+s.
An equilibrium of this economy is a set of variables
Ωt =
{
yt, ct, kt, It,mt, nt, Rt, µt, wt, wt(j), Pt, πt
}
,
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which is described by equations (33) to (39), as well as (2), (7) , (10), (11), and (32).
Furthermore, the steady state is characterized by a positive inﬂation rate, which
leads (in contrast to Erceg (1997) or Huang and Liu (2002)) to an asymmetric
solution. Because of the staggered nominal wages which leads to a varying real
wage, we obtain for labour supply and demand of diﬀerent groups j, k in period t:
nt(j) = nt(k) ∀ j = k and j, k ∈ [0, 1].
For our calibrations we assume that the economy starts in an equilibrium with
ﬂexible prices and every group of households has determined their (identical) optimal
nominal wages. The steady state of this economy is deﬁned as a state in which the
growth rate of money equals the growth rate of goods prices as well as nominal
wages.11 Therefore, the steady state is characterized by the constancy of aggregate
variables.12
4 Calibration
For the calibration we assume the following function speciﬁcations:
yt(i) = zt
[
kt−1(i)
]α[
nt(i)
]1−α
(40)
u(ct,mt, nt) =
((
bcνt + (1− b)mνt
) 1
ν
)1−Φ
1− Φ −
n1−ηt
1− η (41)
The calibration are chosen in accordance with the literature. In our study we
follow basically Ireland (1997) and Walsh (1998, 2003b). The calibration of our
models is consistent with the following scenario: the capital share of total income,
α, is 30 %, the discount factor, β, is assumed to be 4 % per year and the depreciation
rate, δ, is 10 % per year. In the steady state, the households work 30 % of their time
endowment. The annual growth rate of the nominal stock of money, g¯, is assumed
as 5 %. The markup of the monopolistic intermediate goods producers is 20 %, i.e.
θ = 6. φP = 3.95 denotes that the costs of price adjustments correspond to a ratio
of 0.03 % of GDP. Furthermore, according to Erceg (1997) the household’s markup
is assumed as 11 % which corresponds to a value of ζ = 10. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of consumption as well as of labour are assumed as 2.0,
i.e. Φ = 0.5 and η = 1, respectively. The parameters b and ν, which determine the
11Cf. Ascari and Rankin (2002): 661.
12A detailed description of the steady states can be found in Gerke (2003).
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steady state holdings of money and the interest rate elasticity of money demand,
are chosen analogous to Chari et al. (2000).
Table 1: Parameter Speciﬁcations
Model - I
α β δ η b Φ
0.30 0.99 0.025 1.0 0.98 0.5
φz Θ ψz ψω σ σω
-0.15 1.0125 0.95 0.687 0.007 0.00216
θ φP ζ ν
6.0 3.95 10 -1.56
For the subsequent analysis the model is log-linearized (ﬁrst order approxima-
tion) and solved by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients in order to get a recur-
sive equilibrium law of motion (see Uhlig (1999) for details).
5 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
An expansionary monetary impulse increases the household’s resources. However,
the aggregate wage level cannot increase proportionally to the monetary injection,
because the speed of adjustment of nominal wages depends on the ability of the
households adjust their individual wages. In addition, the price level does not adjust
proportionally, too, because of the ﬁrms who set their optimal prices as a markup
over marginal costs which are determined by real wages as well as rental costs. As a
result, real aggregate demand increases, raising both households’ income and ﬁrms’
demand for labour services. Therefore, the marginal utility of income (consump-
tion) decreases, whereas the marginal utility of leisure increases. Those households
who are able to adjust their nominal wages choose their wages according to the
maximization rule, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure equals real wages including a markup.13 Thereby, the household recognizes
13Note that the j-th household sets its real wage such that it corresponds with the marginal rate
of substitution of consumption and leisure weighted with the respective markup, i.e.
wt(j) =
ζ
ζ − 1MRS,
see also Ascari (2000):167.
12
that the possible increase of their nominal wages will trigger the job mediator to
demand more labour from those households who are not able to adjust their wages.
This substitution eﬀect as well as the income eﬀect (due to a higher relative wage)
counteract the primary reduction of the marginal utility of income and the pri-
mary increase of the marginal utility of leisure and therefore dampen the increase of
wages. The higher the elasticity of substitution among diﬀerentiated labour skills,
the smaller the optimal percentage change in wages and thus the higher the persis-
tence of output. The increase of nominal wages will therefore not be proportional
to the increase of aggregate demand.
Assuming a positive steady state inﬂation rate gives a further incentive to the
households to increase their nominal wages. Therefore, households try to set their
nominal wages such that the real wage that prevails on average in the next four
periods corresponds to the real wage in absence of inﬂation or, equivalently, which
they would set in a ﬂexible wage setup when he can adjust real wage every period.
Due to the symmetry of the model the decision problem of the subsequent household
group is identical to that of the ﬁrst group which adjusts its nominal wage without
time lag.
Because of the gradual price increase following the monetary injection the reac-
tions of the households are dampened in periods t+1, t+2, ... . At the end of this
transmission process the real variables converge to the initial steady state.14
5.1 Quantitative Analysis
Our numerical analysis is structured as follows. In order to examine the factors
which determine persistent reactions we compare a ﬂex-price version, i.e. we assume
φP = 0, with a sticky price version, i.e. we set φP = 3.95, of our model. Furthermore,
we analyze the business cycle properties of the models and compare them to U.S.
time series data.
The impulse response functions (see ﬁgures 1 and 2 below) reﬂect the optimal de-
cisions of the households and ﬁrms. The variables labour, output and consumption
(ﬁgure 1) react positively to the monetary impulse. Furthermore, the immediate
response of real wages is negatively whereas we observe a positive response of real
cash balances (ﬁgure 2).
14Note, that long run monetary neutrality still holds in this setup.
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Figure 1: No adjustment costs (y, c, l)
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Figure 2: No Adjustment Costs (p,m,w)
After one year, when every household has used its possibility to adjust wages we
observe a smooth adjustment process to the steady state. Furthermore, the intro-
duction of price adjustment costs does not lead to a lower degree of persistence, as
shown by ﬁgures 3 and 4 below.
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Figure 3: Adjustment costs (y, c, l)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
Impulse responses to a shock in money−growth
Years after shock
Pe
rc
en
t d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
money       
wage        
price−level 
Figure 4: Adjustment costs (p,m,w)
Our results suggests that ﬁrms do not have a strong incentive to adjust their prices.
This can be seen in ﬁgure 5 where inﬂation reacts both cases, i.e. with and without
price adjustment costs, rather inertially.
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Figure 5: Inﬂation Response
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Figure 6: Interest Rate and Markup
Obviously ﬁrms do not have an incentive to adjust their prices because the unit costs
or equivalently the markup do not react sensible, because the increase of rental price
for capital is rather low (see ﬁgures 5 and 6). All in all, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the ﬂex-price (blue) and the sticky price (red) version the model.
The remaining question is, why do we observe the aforementioned adjustment
pattern? Already Erceg (1997) has pointed out that the dynamic reactions of the
variables after a monetary shock depend on the speciﬁcation of money demand. In
particular, when an income-based money demand function and, in addition, a high
income elasticity is used, the model yields persistent reactions.15 Given the evolution
of prices the behavior of output is determined by the output elasticity of money
demand. Therefore, in the case of a low income elasticity, output (consumption)
has to rise by a large amount to allow the demand for real balances to adjust to the
higher nominal supply. A consumption-based money demand function in general
implies a very low income elasticity of money demand, as consumption varies much
less than output in response to a transitory shock. Thus, given sticky prices in the
short run, consumption must rise high enough in order to allow the demand for
real balances to adjust to the higher nominal supply. After the period of the shock
output declines subsequently because producers demand much larger price increases
than occur in equilibrium to keep output close to its initial peak. This suggests that
output persistency is increased by imposing a structure that makes consumption
15Cf. Erceg (1997):4
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more responsive to income.
However, our calibration implies a consumption elasticity of money demand equal
to one whereas the interest rate elasticity, i.e. 1/(1−ν) = −.39, is rather low. How-
ever, a utility speciﬁcation analogous to Fischer (1979), where the interest rate
elasticity equals the consumption elasticity of money demand, does not produce any
persistent responses due to monetary shocks.16 Following the reasoning above, the
dynamics does depend on the interest rate sensitivity. If money demand reacts sen-
sitive to an increase of the interest rate households diminish their money holdings by
more as if this is the case when money demand is insensitive to interest rate ﬂuctu-
ations. In consequence, again, output has to rise enough to prompt the households
to hold the additional money supply.
We conclude the discussion of the monetary transmission process by taking a
glimpse on the business cycle properties of the model variants. Concentrating on
the following variables, output (y), consumption (c), hours (n), inﬂation (π), and
real wages (w) we obtain for the model variants and the U.S. :
Table 2: Business Cycle Properties
volatilitya x(t− 5) x(t− 2) x(t− 1) x(t) x(t + 1) x(t + 2) x(t + 5)
Modelb
y 0.0206 0.01 0.69 0.89 1.00 0.89 0.69 0.01
π 42.169 -0.19 -0.26 -0.12 0.02 0.33 0.28 0.16
c 0.718 0.08 0.81 0.89 0.87 0.62 0.41 -0.02
n 1.077 -0.07 0.46 0.72 0.93 0.95 0.79 0.08
w 0.393 0.20 0.56 0.32 -0.01 -0.25 -0.31 -0.17
U.S.c
y 0.0106 -0.31 0.42 0.72 1.00 0.72 0.42 -0.31
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) — (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
π 18.837 -0.28 -0.37 -0.22 0.03 0.24 0.40 0.42
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
c 0.767 -0.12 0.56 0.74 0.79 0.52 0.27 -0.30
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
n 0.341 -0.08 0.48 0.65 0.73 0.47 0.20 -0.39
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
w 0.663 0.12 0.54 0.55 0.46 0.27 0.11 -0.34
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07)
a
Measured as the standard deviation of the respective variable around trend relative to the standard deviation of Output.
b
Note that the obtained correlations for both variants are based on the ﬂex-price versions of the model. Applying the sticky-price
versions leads to slight changes in the magnitudes of the obtained correlations, only, but not to changes in signs.
c
Own calculations, with real quarterly data taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators 2004 for the period 1964.2-1999.4.
The real wage is based on own calculations. Wages are measured as hourly wages taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004).
All variables are measured in per capita units and are HP-ﬁltered. The empirical standard errors (noted in parentheses below the
coeﬃcients) are obtained from Bootstrap simulations.
16Cf. Walsh (2003b): 69.
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Comparing the obtained autocorrelations of our simulations with U.S. time se-
ries data we observe that the model ﬁts the empirical facts in several dimensions
reasonably well, except the lagged correlations of the real wage do not coincide with
the empirical ﬁndings.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Of course, one could argue that the obtained results depend on the parameter values
chosen in our calibration. However, as can be seen below, for reasonable variations of
parameters that are crucial, for instance, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of labour or consumption there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the strength of the
contract multiplier.17 Furthermore, a variation in ζ, the elasticity of substitution
of labour, or the presence of price adjustment costs do not lead to a noteworthy
increase in output persistency.
In a ﬁrst step we examine the eﬀects of price adjustment costs, in a second one
we vary ζ in an interval between 5 and 20. Basic intuition would conclude that
the higher (lower) elasticity of substitution among diﬀerentiated labour skills leads
to a smaller percentage change in wages and ceteris paribus to a lower (higher)
increase of unit costs and therefore dampen the incentive of ﬁrms to increase their
goods prices. Similarly, an increase of the adjustment costs lowers potentially the
incentive of ﬁrms to adjust prices. However, our quantitative examination do not
reveal a notable increase of persistence.18
Signiﬁcant changes due to parameter variations can be observed in our model
when a high interest rate elasticity of money demand as well as a high steady state
ratio of money per consumption is assumed. In contrast to our baseline calibration
we set ν = −0.4, that gives an interest rate elasticity of -2.5, and furthermore, we
reduce the parameter b to b = 0.35.19 In this setup the households give higher weight
17See, for example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Ascari (2000), or Chari et al. (2000).
18See ﬁgures 10 to 12 in appendix A.
19The money demand function is implied by eqns. (26) and (27) and follows as
ln(mt) =
1
1− ν ln
(
1− b
b
)
− 1
1− ν ln
(
i
1 + i
)
+ ln ct.
17
to real money balances which results in higher money holdings in the steady state.
Furthermore, the low value of b determines the magnitude a monetary injection has
on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real cash balances.
In particular, the eﬀect of the higher interest rate elasticity is strengthened because
of a sharp reduction of the rate of substitution, i.e. households now have a higher
incentive to consume more than to hold money. As shown by ﬁgures 7 and 8 below,
the magnitudes of output and the inﬂation responses are higher when we allow for
a higher interest rate elasticity of money demand as well as a higher share of money
in utility function. However, we observe a sharp decrease of output persistence (see
ﬁgure 7), but no qualitative diﬀerence in the persistence of inﬂation (ﬁgure 8).
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Figure 7: Output persistence
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Figure 8: Inﬂation persistence
The higher response of the rental price of capital (ﬁgure 9) tempts the ﬁrms to adjust
their goods prices. Therefore, the real wage converges rather fast to its steady value.
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Figure 9: Interest Rate persistence
Given a setup in which a high interest rate elasticity of money demand is assumed
which further goes at hand with a higher steady state share of money holdings per
18
consumption (output) the observed degree of persistency of real variables decreases
signiﬁcantly.
6 Conclusion
In the recent macroeconomic debate, as pointed out by Chari et al. (2000), it is
generally accepted that sticky price models alone are insuﬃcient to generate persis-
tent real eﬀects of monetary shocks that are observed empirically. A greater degree
of persistence is achieved, as shown by Andersen (1998) or Huang and Liu (1999),
when staggered wage contracts are assumed. However, as, for example, noted by
Edge (2002), the models oﬀered by the latter strand of literature fail to reproduce,
the extend of empirically observed persistence. In this line of research, Edge (2002)
or Woodford (2003) have shown that a reasonable degree of persistency of real vari-
ables can be generated either by staggered wages or prices once one allows for speciﬁc
factor market imperfections.20
Although we do not neglect the importance of factor market frictions, the ques-
tion whether staggered wages alone are suﬃcient to generate persistent eﬀects re-
mained open. The present paper shows that staggered wage contracts are a necessary
condition for reproducing persistent eﬀects of real variables, whereby the the consid-
eration of price adjustment costs as a source of price stickiness fails to improve the
model’s ability to generate reasonable responses. However, as shown in section 5.2,
the assumption of staggered wage contracts has to be accompanied by a low rate of
steady state money holdings as well as a suﬃciently low interest rate elasticity of
money demand.
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A Sensitivity Analysis
The eﬀects of price adjustment costs as well as variations in ζ are shown in ﬁgures
10 and 10 below:
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Figure 10: Variations in φ,
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Figure 11: Variations in ζ, φ = 0
0,000
0,005
0,010
0,015
0,020
0,025
0,030
0,035
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Periods
%
 
D
e
v.
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
ζ=10
ζ=5
ζ=20
Figure 12: Variations in ζ, φ = 3.95
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